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PART I
A. Introduction

This paper provides a comparative critical analysis of the data privacy
laws in the European Union and the United States. The first part will provide
a descriptive analysis of the EU and U.S. regulatory framework and aims to
illuminate the divergent approaches the respective frameworks take in relation to data privacy. By way of demonstrating how these jurisdictions differ,
it provides an underlying foundational understanding of the history, rationale, and legal justifications of the respective policy frameworks. This paper recognizes the divergent interpretations both jurisdictions place on the
individual as the ultimate bearer of legal rights.1 Namely, the U.S. places
considerable weight on marketplace discourse where the individual is seen
as a “privacy consumer.” As a participant in the digital market the individual
trades her personal information in exchange for “free” services, thereby commodifying data as a way of serving the market’s purpose. A lot of this reasoning hinges on the benefits of innovation and the economic flourishing
granted by the rise of technology companies, thus in its view worthy of considerable protection. The EU’s approach to data privacy places significantly
more weight on the individual rights of its “data subjects.” The emphasis on
dignity and democratic self-rule have been central to the European project
since the end of World War II. Although the EU recognizes the economic
benefits of international data transfers within the “Digital Single Market,”
the enacted General Data Protection Regulation2 places strict limits on such
activity. The EU’s rights-centred framework provides an interesting comparison to the U.S. “patchwork”3 of information privacy law, which this paper
aims to address in more detail.
With such divergent underlying interests and foundational rationales at
play, working towards a harmonized international data transfer framework
becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. However, the inter-jurisdictional
1. Paul M Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J.
115, 115 (2017).
2. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679.
3. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 118.

Spring 2022

EU AND U.S. DATA PRIVACY REGIMES

129

operability of data and the interconnectivity of technology makes the need
to devise such a framework inevitable. In order to understand which approach will work, it is essential to go beyond the underlying theoretical explanations provided in the first part of this paper and complement these with
the practical realities that shape so many of our bilateral agreements today.
Therefore, the second half will delve further into the underlying theoretical
rationales underpinning the contemporary data privacy frameworks of the
EU and U.S. and attempt to critically analyse the practical coherence of these
premises. In doing so, it bridges theory with practice by assessing whether
any ulterior explanations exist regarding these jurisdictions’ inherently contrasting views to data privacy. It will argue that the different evolutionary
trajectories of the data economies in these different parts of the world, should
be attributed beyond the divergent regulatory philosophies underpinning
them.
In doing so, this paper will demonstrate that these competing trends go
beyond the clear-cut distinction that try to place the U.S. in the realm of advancing economic prosperity and the EU within the confines of a mere
rights-based context. Namely, competition policy plays an equally important
role, one from which privacy cannot be detached. In order to attain a balanced framework that recognises the economic benefit of data transfers on
the one hand and privacy on the other, the intellectual debate around the importance of privacy within the confines of competition analysis has become
more prevalent than ever. This approach is necessary for the preservation of
autonomy, dignity, privacy and competition. Core democratic principles that
come hand-in-hand with any regime that focuses on data transfers and innovation. With a coordinated and targeted framework that understands the underlying dynamics of contemporary digital markets, can adequate policy instruments and effective techniques for their implementation at an
international level be realized. Something the current transatlantic data transfer regime fails to administer by implementing measures that disregard the
inherent complexities of today’s data-driven economy. This paper advocates
a step-by-step approach to achieving a detailed and sophisticated framework
by focusing on both ex-ante and ex-post regulatory techniques that will, in
turn, enable economic growth to take off and privacy concerns to be protected. Thereby bringing the EU’s undue attachment to fundamental rights
and the U.S.’s obsession with ongoing economic prosperity, within the confines of a balanced and proportionate framework that serves in the interest
of both transatlantic competition and data privacy.
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B. The United States Framework

In the United States data privacy law is based on the conception of data
marketability. This view merits governmental protection in a marketplace
marked by deception and unfairness.4 Therefore, the United States’ legal
framework in the area of data privacy focuses primarily on the “marketplace
discourse” regarding personal information and the safeguarding of individuals participating in the digital market, who are referred to as “privacy consumers.”5 In this view the individual is a trader of a personal commodity,
namely her personal data. According to this line of reasoning the individual
partakes in market relations within the confines of the digital economy and
is placed into this digital market realm without any knowledge or prior intent
to participate in it in the first place. To understand the origins and rationales
of this version of individual legal identity, it is necessary to understand the
historical, cultural and legal understandings of data privacy in the United
States and how this view is reflected in the constitutional and statutory protections granted to the privacy consumer in the first place. This in turn depicts the relative legal status of the individual vis a vis the entities that collect
and process personal data and thus the extent to which the privacy consumer
in the U.S. is considered autonomous in relation to the transfer of their personal data.
The underlying rationale for relying on marketplace discourse around
privacy is clearly emphasized in the 2012 report, Consumer Data Privacy in
a Networked World.6 This report focused on consumer confidence and trust
in the technologies and companies that drive the digital economy. The White
House notes the positive role of data trade and the governmental role in “promoting innovation.”7 In this regard, the report’s view places personal data as
the catalyser for the advertising marketplace which in turn “brings many
online services and sources of content to consumers for free.”8 It is the bilateral self-interest that holds sway, where personal information is another commodity in the market that contributes to human flourishing to the extent that
the individual can maximize her preferences regarding data trades.9 Information privacy law in the U.S., therefore, follows the logic of the market
place as opposed to the protection of privacy rights when policing fairness
in exchange of personal data. This line of reasoning bears its foundation from
4. Id. at 119.
5. Id.
6. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 41-32 (Feb.
2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 132.
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the start of the Internet’s commercialization, which occurred during the Clinton Administration.10 The positive economic impact of technology companies shaped the thinking of policymakers around the time and set a rationale
for shaping a legal framework that sought to actively protect the technology
sector’s growth.11 Namely, the “rights-bearer of U.S. information privacy is
a consumer who benefits from the presence of innovative technologies and
merits protection from market failures.”12 This conflation of economic progress and individual benefit “is to be expected in an era that does not differentiate too pedantically between what is good for business and what is good
for people.”13 As a result, regulators have relied on industry self-regulation
within this sphere of economic progress and established the importance of
this aim in the 1997 Commerce Department compilation of papers regarding
self-regulation of privacy in the information age.14 More recently, however,
the promotion of innovation and the protection of consumer trust were central under the Obama Administration and it hoped that “consumer data privacy could help establish more flexible, innovation-enhancing privacy models among our international partners.”15 Yet, with the strongest constitutional
protections in the U.S. being granted to data processors as opposed to individuals, it is undeniably clear that innovation as opposed to consumer privacy won the upper hand in this strive to fairness.
Under the U.S. Constitution, there is no right to information privacy as
there is a right to data protection in the EU. The absence of such positive
rights granted by the government can be traced back to the underlying foundational principles used for drafting the U.S. Constitution. Namely, the constitution does not oblige the government to take positive steps to create conditions to allow for the existence of fundamental rights.16 The Constitution’s
creation of a government of only limited powers reflects the American fear
of oppression from governmental power.17 In particular, the State Action
Doctrine demonstrates this limited reach in the area of individual rights.
Namely, regardless of how strongly an activity protected as a recognized
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
Steve Poole, “To Save Everything, Click Here by Evgeny Morozov – Review”, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2013/mar/20/save-everythingevgeny-morozov-review.
14. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (June
1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-self-regulation-information-age.
15. Consumer Data Privacy, 1.
16. Deshaney v. Winnebago City Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
17. Frank I. Michelman, The State Action Doctrine, in Global Perspectives on Constitutional
Law 228, 234.
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individual right has been interfered with, if it occurred though private action
the Constitution does not apply at all.18 One of the main purposes of this
doctrine is that “individual liberties shall be protected by ensuring that private action is not subject to constitutional limitations . . . .”19 This purpose
undoubtedly gives way to problems when individual rights infringements
occur in private relationships. For example, when a private company collects
and processes private data of individuals without the latter’s informed and
explicit consent, the state action doctrine prevents the application of individual rights because the actors are private. The Supreme Court’s reasoning for
this doctrine is that it “preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting
the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.”20 However, “preserving
areas that are free from individual rights does not mean that these areas are
free from individual rights infringements.”21 The result may actually be less
as opposed to more individual freedom because “state and private actors are
free to interfere with people’s individual rights, unless limited by other federal or state law.”22 The only freedom truly protected, therefore, is the freedom of the infringer, not the freedom of the infringement’s victim. Over time
the court has developed exceptions to this principle.23 In my opinion, the fact
that these are exceptions as opposed to matters of principle demonstrate that
the lack of any constitutional protection of data collection under the U.S.
constitution won’t change any time soon.
Disputes around information privacy in the public sector brought before
the courts have addressed the availability of the right to privacy in numerous
occasions. However, the most recent case concerning the availability of the
right proved to be unresolved and therefore any doubts regarding its potential
existence have been kept in place.24 The two most important sources of this
interest are the fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.25 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against
the collection of certain kinds of personal information by the government
and safeguards the rights of the people to be secure against searches of

18. Stephan Jaggi, State Action Doctrine, Oxford Constitutional Law (Oct. 2017), https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e473.
19. Id.
20. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
21. Jaggi, State Action Doctrine, https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/lawmpeccol-e473.
22. Id.
23. Herndon v. Nixon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
24. Nasa v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011).
25. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 133.
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“persons, houses, papers and effects.” However, this Amendment fails to
accord to “the conditions of modern governmental use of personal data in
routinized databases that administer public benefits and services.”27 Namely,
“the government’s action cannot be limited by a constitutional concept first
requiring a search or seizure when referring to information already in its databases.”28 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent does not protect the individual when a “third party”, such as a bank, surrenders personal information to
the government.29 Data processors are also using the First Amendment to
stop or narrow information privacy laws, which has undoubtedly proven successful.30 In this capacity, the Supreme Court invalidated a Vermont law that
prevented pharmacies from selling prescriber-identifying information without the prescribing party’s consent because of its restriction of “speech in aid
of pharmaceutical marketing.”31 This once again shows that the free flow of
data, not personal privacy, serves as the underlying concern in relation to the
most significant constitutional safeguards for information in the U.S. Article
III’s requirements for standing have also proved to be ill-equipped for effective recourse to the judicial system. A claimant must establish concrete harm
in order to demonstrate its case or controversy under Article III.32 The difficulty for establishing this requirement was further limited by the Supreme
Court when it established constitutional parameters for standing in privacy
cases.33 Namely, more than a “bare procedural violation” of a statute had to
be shown.34 A “concrete and particularized” privacy harm resulting from a
party’s shortcoming needs to be demonstrated.35 As privacy harms in our
digital world tend to be abstract and unquantifiable infringements due to their
anonymity and encrypted way of being stored on databases, claimants have
a very high burden to convince the court of their “concrete and particularized” injury.
The overarching focus of U.S. data privacy policy is one of continued
innovation and economic prosperity. The digital revolution that has proved
to be quintessential to the rise in technological development, which in turn
spurred economic growth, serves as the foundational rationale of the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

U.S. Constitution Amendment IV.
Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Care, 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 SC 1138, 1155 (2013).
Spokeo v Robins, 136 SC 1540, 1550 (2016).
Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1547.
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“patchwork” of the U.S. data privacy rules. The result has been increased
policy in favour of further expansion of digital technology giants and seeing
the individual as a “privacy consumer” in order to advance the ongoing surge
in economic progress. In short, information privacy law in the U.S. envisions
privacy interest protections as being embedded within the market structure
and specific consumer relationships.37 The procedural protections in place
reflect this notion by setting strict parameters for making a successful data
privacy claim. The current framework’s failure, or unwillingness, to recognize the privacy cost to consumers in return for “free” online services demonstrates this beyond anything else.
C. The European Union Framework

The EU data privacy framework derives its rationale from a rightsbased perspective centred on the individual whose data is processed. Data
protection is, therefore, afforded constitutional protection as a fundamental
right anchored in interests of dignity, personality, and self-determination.38
The emergence of fundamental rights and, in particular, the recognition of
the right to dignity and personality within the constitutional law of different
legal systems begun before World War II. However, it was not until after the
war that the constitutions of Italy (1947) and Germany (1949) were at the
forefront of entrenching these rights into their legal orders.39 The continent’s
terrible experience of fascism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism emanating from these countries, sparked the foundational elements for the European
interest in privacy and data protection.40 Moreover, the influence of secret
police operations conducting large-scale surveillance and data gathering
practices in Western and Eastern Europe alike has profoundly increased the
sensitivities towards data protection throughout the EU.41 These experiences
coupled with the rise of dignity and personality interests in European Law
played vital roles in the development of information privacy rights.
This European wide appeal to the creation of a post-war identity resulted in the development of a supranational system of fundamental rights,
which are now protected by institutions such as the European Court of Justice, within the EU, and the European Court of Human Rights, separated

36. Schwartz and Peifer, supra note 1, at 132.
37. Id. at 136.
38. Id. at 123.
39. Grundgesetz (GG) (Basic Law), art. 1-2; art. 2-3 Constituzione (Italian Constitution).
40. Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German right of
Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1925,
1948-49 (2010).
41. Id.
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from the EU’s realm. The Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter: the
Charter) serves as a key constitutional document of the EU, whereas the European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter: ECHR) serves as an international treaty and binds the contracting states as part of its body of international law.43 Together they function as the two pillars of fundamental rights
in Europe. EU law, in contrast, functions as a supranational body to which
the 27 Member States shift part of their sovereignty. In turn, the EU issues
binding directives and regulations which, once enacted, become binding law
within and between the Member States.
Fast-forward in time where the European rights regime “came to include not only privacy, but also an explicit right to data protection.”44
Namely, the ECHR grants the individual a “right to respect for his private
and family life.”45 The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: ECtHR), which was established by the ECHR, built on this right to identify specific rights regarding data protection. In Copland v United Kingdom46 the
court held that the collection and storage of personal information related to
an individual’s telephone, e-mail, and Internet usage, without her
knowledge, implicated Article 8 rights. Akin to the ECHR, the Charter under
the EU protects privacy and also contains an explicit right to data protection
under Article 8(1).47 What becomes evident from our assessment of the institutional guarantees of fundamental rights and data privacy in particular, is
that the EU has an overlap of judicial institutions and governance layers for
their protection.48 To go even further, the European Court of Justice (hereafter: ECJ) has recognised the debate between the relationship of the right to
privacy in Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 of the Convention, and the
explicit right of data protection under Article 8 of the Charter.49 In the cases
Schecke and Eifert v Land Hessen50 the ECJ combined both concepts and
held that EU law protects the right to respect for private life with regard to
the processing of personal data, thereby formally constitutionalizing data
protection within EU law. Furthermore, in contrast to the U.S. approach the
42. European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October
2012, 2012/C 364/10; United Nations Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
43. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 1.
44. Schwartz and Peifer, supra note 1, at 125.
45. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8.
46. Copland v. United Kingdom, No. 62617/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12 (2007).
47. Art. 8(1) reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”
48. Schwartz and Peifer, supra note 1, at 125.
49. Id.
50. C-92/09 and C-93/09, 2010 E.C.R. 662 at Para.52.
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rights to privacy and data protection under EU law do not merely constrain
the government, but they also require positive government action to protect
the individual. Beyond these “vertical” rights applications concerning government-on-private matters, rights applications also reach private-on-private
relations and thereby have “horizontal” effect.51
The above demonstrates that the resulting European data protection
framework views the data subject, i.e. the individual, as central to its analysis
and places her as the ultimate bearer of rights. In this regard “it views data
privacy as part of its legal culture of fundamental rights.”52 However, beyond
a historical and descriptive perspective it is also essential to illuminate the
foundational legitimacy for the framework’s existence and its understanding
of where the individual’s legal identity comes from when placed in the EU
context. Namely, data protection law is leading the effort in the hope of creating a sense of European citizenship through development and enforcement
of European constitutional rights. Thus, its aim is to protect individuals from
risks to “personhood.”53 What this ultimately means is that adequate protections and limitations on the type of personal information that can be traded
is dependent on the preservation of democratic self-rule, the protection of
autonomy, preventing the erosion of the capacity of self-determination and
avoiding a negative collective impact. The aspiration to create a new model
of political cooperation with the goal of bringing lasting peace to Europe,
has been the main catalyser and rationale for enabling these functions. According to this line of reasoning adequate protections against the collection,
use, or transfer of personal data also serves the wider policy initiative that
contributes to the EU’s aim of preventing negative impact on democratic
values, which in turn serves the framework’s underlying principles and rationale.54
However, beyond the safeguard of privacy and data protection for the
individual, the EU also protects the free flow of information. By establishing
an internal market for personal data in which there is “free movement of
goods, services and capital,” it endeavors to ensure both a free flow or personal data from one member state to another, and “high standards of data
protection to protect the fundamental rights of individuals.”55 Therefore, beyond the emphasis on democratic self-rule and dignity, the EU has a profound interest in access to the global information economy and its resulting

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Mangold v Helm, 2005 ECtHR 709, (Nov. 22, 2005).
Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 126.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 171.
Council Directive 95/4, art. 3, 1995 O.J. (EC).
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economic proliferations. The “Digital Market Initiative” of the EU shows
its awareness of the benefits in participating in relations that promote advanced technology and related services.57 Of course, upon initial reflection
this inevitably gives rise to conflicting ideals. But, if these two competing,
or arguably complementary interest, conflict, the ECJ undertakes a proportionality analysis. Under this test, the question is whether the law’s protection of another relevant interest can be carried out in a way that is least restrictive to the protection of privacy.58 In contrast to the U.S., the EU’s
economic interests in information and the potential negative impact on the
activities of data processors are not considered to be especially important.59
In the case of Google Spain the ECJ held that the free flow of information
matters, but not as much as the safeguarding of dignity, privacy, and data
protection under the European rights regime.60 The General Data Protection
Regulation61 speaks of this importance and sets out the balance between the
free flow of information and a high level of protection of personal data within
its framework.62 Under the GDPR, the aforementioned high status of the data
subject comes to the foreground once again. Namely, by way of Regulation
EU law mandates directly binding statutory protection for the data subject
throughout the EU. Furthermore, this safeguard is more than evident in the
area of damages following from harms to the individual. No materiality factors in cases of a serious injury of one’s sphere of privacy need to be proven
and the GDPR explicitly states that it does not depend on harm to a monetary
or property interest when personal information is misused.63 Although data
protection is not “boundless” under the EU data protection framework, the
above demonstrates that it grants data subjects a privileged position in a way
that is substantially different from that of its U.S. counterpart.64

56. Schwartz and Peifer, supra note 1, at 130.
57. European Commission, Digital Single Market – Bringing Down Barriers to Unlock Online
Opportunities, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en.
58. Schwartz and Peifer, supra Note 1, at 131 (discussing Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with
Judges (2000)).
59. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 7. 2016 O.J. (L119) 1.
60. Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (2014) (Case C‐131/12) No.80
(Spain).
61. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119) 1.
62. Commission Regulation 2016/679, arts. 6-7. 2016 O.J. (L119) 1.
63. Jan Philipp Albercht and Florian Jotzo, Das Neue Datenschutzrecht der EU (Ger.), 2017,
at 126-129.
64. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 82. 2016 O.J. (L119) 1.
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D. Divergence of Data Privacy Regimes

The first part of this article has demonstrated the divergence in approach
towards data protection regulation between the EU and U.S. By way of addressing the underlying history, rationale and legal justifications of the respective jurisdictions, it provides a foundational comparative understanding
for how and why these regimes differ. To reiterate, U.S. data privacy law is
based on the conception of data marketability where the individual is seen as
a market participant by way of trading a personal commodity, namely her
personal data. This rationale stems from the view that sees data transferability as essential to the promotion of innovation. The positive economic impact
of technology companies, therefore, shaped the thinking of U.S. data privacy
law and ultimately serves to protect the technology sector’s continuing
growth. On the other hand, the EU data privacy framework finds its origins
throughout history. Two World Wars and extensive government surveillance
and data gathering practices during the Cold War played vital roles in the
development of information privacy rights. Therefore, the rise of dignity and
personality interests sparked the European wide appeal to the creation of a
post-war identity. The adoption of the GDPR and institutions such as the ECJ
and ECtHR came as a result and protect the established supranational system
of fundamental rights. With an explicit right to data protection under EU law,
its framework views the individual as central to its analysis and places her as
the ultimate bearer of rights. In this regard, the framework aims to protect
the individual’s personhood, autonomy and its capacity of self-determination, which serve the aspiration of bringing lasting peace to Europe. This line
of reasoning has been transposed into the contemporary framework of data
transferability, as can be seen by the limits put in place on such practices.
Ultimately, they contribute to the EU’s aims by preventing the negative impact on democratic values, and thus serving the framework’s underlying
principles and rationales.
By way of further expanding on this comparative analysis, the next section of this paper will critically analyse these frameworks by addressing the
potential for future harmonisation and cooperation in the area of international data transfers. It gives a fundamental understanding of how underlying
political, ideological and competition law (in the U.S. commonly referred to
as antitrust la) influenced dynamics all play their respective, mutually reinforcing, roles in understanding both regimes and their potential for convergence. In this capacity, it will demonstrate that the clear-cut “distinction”
that tries to place the U.S. in the realm of advancing economic prosperity
and the EU within the confines of a mere rights-based context garners further
exploration and analysis. Precedent international data transfer frameworks
provide constructive context when addressing the question of what a future
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international data transfer framework can and should look like. Simultaneously recognizing how technology outpaces the law in this context, the challenge for regulators today will be to adapt their approach in achieving convergence by focusing on the inherent technicalities and complexities that
define our digital era.

PART II
A. A Dissemination of the European Union’s Approach

The European Union (EU) began as an economic trading zone in
1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community. But, rights talk has always
formed an essential part of the European project that brought it beyond the
rationalisation of trade in coal and steel or safeguarding the free movement
of goods.65 As the first part of this paper set out, the aftermath of the destruction of the second world war, heavy surveillance practices in Eastern Europe
during the Cold War and the continent’s overall terrible experience of fascism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism have played significant roles in
the desire for a new model of political cooperation, with the ultimate goal of
bringing lasting peace to Europe. From this aspiration led the creation of the
Supranational authority we know today as the EU, a body with “the power
to bind its constituent member states.”66 This section will outline how the
creation of the wider European project has been met with considerable challenges and how the emergence of a rights-based narrative helped overcome
these obstacles by propelling the EU’s project to what it has become today.
One of the oft-mentioned obstacles faced by the EU project has been
the “democratic deficit” of its institutions.67 This deficit reflects the dynamic
that exists until this day where the ordinary citizen feels bound to her national
government, but is likely to have a more distant relationship with the EU as
a sovereign entity. As Schwartz and Peifer explain, “too often, the EU is
considered a distant, inaccessible institution. There are complaints about its
transparency, complexity, the dominance of its executive institutions, the inability of its citizens to replace important decision-makers, and the lack of
power for more democratic EU institutions.”68 Although the response to this
was an increase in the power of the European Parliament in 1979, the problems of “secrecy, impenetrability, accountability, and representativeness”69
remained and called for a more suitable response to be made at the
65.
66.
2008).
67.
68.
69.

Schwartz and Peifer, supra note 1, at 145.
Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials, at 5 (4th ed.
Id. at 133.
Schwartz and Peifer, supra note 1, at 145.
Craig and de Burca, supra note 66, at 58.
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constitutional level. One commentator brings this further and argues that
constitutionality is the fundamental key to Europe’s future and its attainment
of a post-World War pan-European identity.70 Under this view, the development and enforcement of European constitutional rights was seen as the
bridge between its citizens’ distant affiliation with its institutions and the
creation of a sense of European citizenship. This line of reasoning goes on
to say that by blurring the lines between the current “double fashion” in
which each individual participates as both a European citizen and through a
role in her home nation, can its goal in achieving a fully integrated European
culture be realized.71 Habermas goes even further and argues that rights talk
forms a critical part of the post-war European project of creating the identity
of the European citizen, and states that this is “central to the EU’s survival”.72
What this demonstrates is that the EU’s development of a shared political
identity is premised on the creation of a common fundamental rights framework. This in turn provides additional context for understanding the emphasis on data protection throughout the EU. In this vain, EU data protection
policy serves as an underlying political smokescreen, which seeks to further
the EU’s prominent and most important objective of establishing a pan-European identity.73 Both the GDPR74 and early caselaw of the ECJ interpreting
the earlier Data Protection Directive75, emphasize similar foundational rationales that focus on an approach in attaining a so-called “common public
sphere”.76 This reflects the notion of an integrated environment in which citizens of Europe will engage in democratic deliberation out of which further
social and market integration takes place.77 The European rights-oriented
project serves a politically salient motive that is undoubtedly premised on
the idea of bringing ever-lasting peace to Europe through an active citizenry
engaged with her European identity. To a large extent, this also provides a
politically motivated ulterior understanding of the ‘lack’ of innovation and
divergence in approach towards its digital economy, in comparison to its
U.S. counterpart. Namely, its desire to focus on and form a cohesive panEuropean community in which its citizens feel socially, ideologically and
economically connected explains its reasons for advancing privacy rights in

70. Jeremy Waldron, The Vanishing Europe of Jürgen Habermas, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, at 70
(Oct. 20, 2015).
71. Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas (2011), 66.
72. Id.
73. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 146.
74. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679.
75. Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC.
76. Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, 59-61.
77. Abraham L. Newman, Protectors of Privacy Regulating Personal Data in the Global
Economy, Cornell University Press (2008), 75.
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the way it has done. Thereby, using its emphasis on human rights as a façade
for the myriad of other politically underlying objectives it aims to achieve.
Although a rights-based approach carries highly important rationales and
certainly functions as a policy reason in and of itself, the following section
will demonstrate how its influence, coupled with burdensome EU competition rules, sacrificed the attainment of a balanced data privacy framework
that recognizes the benefits of both innovation and privacy in accomplishing
the bloc’s ideological aspirations. Before doing so, it will start with a similar
dissection of the U.S.’s approach to data privacy regulation before turning to
that of the EU.
B. Understanding the U.S. Approach

As the previous section of this article lined out, the U.S. data privacy
framework accords very weak constitutional status to information privacy.
For clarification purposes I will briefly recall some of the principles underpinning the U.S. regime. The U.S. constitution is one of “negative rights” in
which the reach of government action into private sector activities and disputes between private persons is significantly constrained.78 Despite existing
constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment, they prove to be poorly fitted within the digital information age
in which governmental databases’ have outpaced the law’s outdated provisions. The widespread sharing of data by individuals is what drives the U.S.
data privacy framework and the U.S. constitution serves as a force for
strengthening the rights of data processors, above anything else.79 What
places the U.S. approach in such stark contrast to that of its European counterpart is the underlying belief that the privacy consumer is far more promising than a “rights model” for privacy, because it ties into deep-rooted
ideas.80 For Americans it is the sovereignty of the consumer that holds sway
as the key individual identity, in which the notion of progress is tied to technology and innovation.81 This line of reasoning accords significantly to technology platforms’ way of thinking in which the “tech gurus in Silicon Valley
and policymakers in Washington, D.C.”, in particular, cherish anything associated with innovation.82 Schwarz and Peifer expand on this by saying that
“from the start of the Internet’s commercialization, it has been associated
with benefits to consumers as well the creation of great wealth for the U.S.

78. Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford
Scholarship Online (2000), 98.
79. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 155.
80. Id.
81. James G. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 394 (2007).
82. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 155.
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economy.” The above makes clear how the American modern capitalist
market economy has taken full-fledged advantage of the rapid rise in innovatory capacity and significant technological advancement. As a result, this
clearly defends the notion that “technology linked to mass consumption is a
modern American hallmark.”84 The narrower conception of U.S. data privacy, therefore, embraces a marketplace discourse in which the privacy consumer is afforded particular attention. Thus, factors that touch upon the area
of personal autonomy, individual privacy and dignity are given significantly
less weight. According to this view, data transfers catalyse the very notion
of this industry’s success and placing any limitations on promoting progress
and innovation would go contrary to the very values underpinning not only
the current framework’s rationale, but also American society’s belief in the
advantages of their current approach.
The foregoing paragraphs endeavoured to delve deeper into the rationales underpinning, arguably, two extreme examples of frameworks
within the data privacy context. My reason for doing so, is to understand
what ulterior and contextual dynamics are at play in shaping the respective
frameworks that go beyond conventional theoretical explanations provided
in the first part of this paper. This will in turn enable this study to conduct a
further critical analysis of these frameworks and assess their potential to
achieve a mutually beneficial and balanced international data privacy regime. Namely, understanding the pitfalls of both frameworks will enable us
to identify a suitable middle-ground, in which reasoned and realistic analysis
drives us to a more pragmatic view to attaining a privacy framework that
serves the needs of both business, individuals, competition and a myriad of
other stakeholders. In my opinion, the conflict of jurisdictions within this
novel area of law should be seen as a unique opportunity in that it has provided the necessary context and legal parameters to experiment with technologically influenced policy that could serve in the interest of nations and generations to come. The next section delves further into the influence of past
and contemporary competition analysis on the U.S. and EU data privacy
frameworks. It aims to demonstrate that modern competition policy should
be updated for the age of digitalisation and big data. Namely, privacy and
competition policy form interconnected parts within the wider policy debate
that envisages a framework that takes into account privacy’s vital influence
on competition analysis in the data driven economy.
C. Digital Economies of Scale: First-mover Advantages v. Stifling

83. Id.
84. Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Innovation and Technological Enthusiasm 1870-1970, (1989), 471.
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Competition Rules

In the U.S., EU data protection is considered by some to be a form
of “trade protectionism, or the result of misguided jealousy toward successful U.S. Internet companies.”85 President Barack Obama’s analysis on European investigations into Facebook and Google depicts this clearly: “Oftentimes what is portrayed as high-minded positions on issues sometimes is just
designed to carve out some of their commercial interests.”86 The feeling in
the U.S. that its approach promotes innovation more effectively than EU data
protection does come to the foreground here. The U.S. sees the EU’s framework as encapsulating stifling rules for tech firms. However, on the EU’s
side there are similar doubts regarding the confines of American privacy.
Namely, as the EU Parliament’s rapporteur for the GDPR has argued: “In
the USA, the handling of our personal information is governed solely by the
very vague rules of fair competition and by considerations regarding the image of the company that will be created amongst consumers themselves.”87
Schwartz and Peifer refer to Andreas Börding’s opinion when assessing U.S. information privacy when he calls to attention its “structural
deficits”88 and the former data protection commissioner of a German state
who argues that U.S. companies rely on a “Violation-of-Data-Protection
Business Model.”89 The EU’s view that the stagnation of U.S. privacy law
has made this possible accords to a broader view, which contends that the
understanding of fundamental rights for the digital age in U.S. privacy law
“has failed to advance beyond the 1970s.”90 Where U.S. commentators have
argued that Congress is not to be trusted to craft privacy legislation and
should therefore not venture into the inner complexities of online privacy
issues, EU policymakers view fundamental data protection rights as something that cannot be left to the market.91 Therefore, policymakers and academics on both sides of the Atlantic have casted doubt, and even a sense of
disbelief on their respective data privacy framework counterparts.
In my opinion, the U.S.’s contention that EU data protection is the
result of “misguided jealousy” is a relatively simplistic account of the
85. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 157.
86. Id.
87. Jan Philipp Albrecht, Hands Off Our Data!, Knaur Taschenbuch (2015), 47.
88. Andres Börding, Ein neues Datenschutzschild für Europa, Computer und Recht 431, 434
(2016), in Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 157.
89. Thilo Weichert, Datenschutzverstoß als Gesch. . .ftsmodell –der Fall Facebook,
Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (2012), 716.
90. Thilo Weichtert, Globaler Kampf um digitale Grundrechte, 47 Kritische Justiz 124
(2014), 127.
91. Thomas Davenport, Should the U.S. Adopt European-Style Data-Privacy Protections?,
WALL
S T.
J.
(2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324338604578328393797127094 (last accessed Nov. 14, 2019).
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underlying historical, cultural and ideological factors discussed thus far
within a union of 27 individual member states. Moreover, the complexity of
digital markets and their data-driven business model encapsulate highly
complex structures that even detailed and targeted government regulation
would fail to understand and place under its auspices. Thus, according the
lack of innovation within the EU’s tech industry solely to an ‘emotionally
influenced’ reaction, in my opinion, fails to capture the total picture. Namely,
data privacy frameworks alone could not have stopped the amalgamation and
development of similar big technology platforms. Especially under their preliminary stages of implementation, e-commerce giants like Amazon would
have ample room to refine their practices that spurred their growth in the first
place and avoid basic regulation. Essentially, data privacy regulation as it
currently stands is an ex post regulatory intervention. It emanates from the
need to place dubious practices under its supervision after the fact that these
previously unforeseen, novel, practices have taken place. It is the firm or
business that is able to capture this market first that benefits from such advantages and grow exponentially in light of its ability to capitalize on being
the only one entering a newly created market. This is, in conceptualized
terms, referred to as the “first-mover advantage”92 The next paragraph will
provide a brief explanation of this phenomenon and take Amazon as an example in order to demonstrate how competition law (or antitrust law) in the
U.S. created the breeding ground for such firms to grow and dominate in an
otherwise novel market. This section will in turn provide a basis on which to
understand the EU’s initial acceptance of mergers within the digital economy
before recognising the need for EU competition law to catch up with technological progress.
D. U.S. Antitrust Law

Amazon’s ability to maintain its unique competitive advantage and
rise to become one of the most successful online e-commerce platforms starts
with the importance of this “first-mover advantage” in industries with network effects.93 Network effects come to be defined as a phenomenon
whereby a product or service gains additional value as more people use it.94
The importance of this concept makes two important conclusions. Firstly,
the existence of a network effect means that one firm, or standard, controls
the market, “since bigger was always better in the eyes of consumers.”95 Secondly, these markets are, therefore, seen as winner-take-all markets and in
92. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms, HARV. BUS. REV. (2016), 23.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 24.
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becoming a winner you had to be the first to start and keep your lead. For
example, Amazon’s business model depicts such a model by maintaining
low prices and investing heavily in leveraging lines of business, thereby creating a variety of network effects to attract as many consumer as possible.
The uniqueness of this model gave it its first-mover advantage and not only
attracted significant consumer, but more importantly, investors’ interest.97
Amazon’s investment in its integrated platform was done at the expense of
profits, therefore, running consecutive losses on its operations, year upon
year.98 However, its success defies contemporary antitrust analysis as, despite, or because, of its predatory pricing and vertical integration techniques,
it has become one of the most dominant e-commerce platforms in the
world.99 By taking a long-term profit maximization approach its investment
ultimately paid off by its significant rise in market share and consumer attraction, which has led it to become the digital platform behemoth it is today.
U.S. antitrust law failed to capture these ‘first-mover’ practices due to the
law’s inherent contradictory rationale and outdated regulatory approach. 100
The U.S.’s ‘success’ in enabling the creation of some of the largest and most
influential technology platforms in the world goes beyond the U.S. conception of data marketability and the view of the individual as a trader of a personal commodity. Namely, it recognizes that U.S. antitrust law serves as a
catalyser in enabling these firms to grow in undoubtedly anti-competitive
ways.101 The current narrowly defined “consumer welfare” test and the large
influence of Chicago School thought102 have served as underlying reasons
out of which policy protection of data transferability arose. What becomes
evident here is that antitrust law, therefore, serves a critical role in the expansion and regulation of the digital economy. From this, just as much as the
U.S. antitrustframework ‘encourages’ first-mover advantages, synergies and
economies of scale within the technology industry, the EU competition law
framework plays a similar, albeit juxtaposed, role by constraining the ability

96. Id.
97. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 770 (2017).
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99. Id. at 771.
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for similar dominant European behemoths to grow. Understanding the respective jurisdictions’ antitrust and competition laws in turn provides yet another way to understand the deeper grounds for differences between the systems. This explanation complements the theme throughout this article by
recognizing the ulterior motive analysis provided above and supports the
view that not one, but several inter-connected factors contribute to these systems’ divergent regulatory approaches to data privacy. However, it must be
noted that due to the inherent nature of our digital economy being driven by
the transfer and sale of large swaths or personal data, it is privacy and competition that warrant our particular focus throughout the remainder of this
study.
E. EU Competition Law

The EU’s competition rules as they stand hinder the emergence of
comparable “European Champions” capable of taking on rivals from China
and America.104 The example of telecoms in the past has shown that Europe
often blocks mergers that would give an operator a dominant position in a
single member state. Contrastingly, American competition counterparts
“tend to look at the effects of a merger across all 50 states.”105 As a result,
Europe has approximately 100 operators, whereas the U.S. is shifting to
three. In order for European companies to increase their profit margins and
international ambitions, European competition rules need to provide more
freedom for businesses to transact. The merger of the railway arms of Germany’s Siemens and France’s Alstom serve as a test in striving towards the
creation of European Champions. Its aim was to create a “Railbus” able to
compete globally much as Airbus does in aircraft. However, the European
Commission seems to be hesitant towards the deal, stating the combination
would yield too much power in Europe.106 In comparison, the U.S. is already
home to national champions that contribute significantly to the wider economy. The question remains why the EU’s protectionist stance prevails in
light of its failure to create similar European iconic companies. As one author
put it, “much of the corporate lethargy is down to archaic labour rules, anaemic capital markets and a balkanised single market”.107 Beyond EU-wide

103. The EU’s industrial-policy fans want to go back to the ‘70s’, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 22,
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economic advantages, a merger friendly approach with concomitant privacy
protections in place will enable European companies to compete at a global
scale.
What this demonstrates is how the EU competition framework
serves as another underlying reason for its retarded growth in the digital
world. Therefore, this dynamic cannot be solemnly explained due to the divergent underlying theoretical rationale underpinning the collection and use
of personal data and the EU’s politically underlying motives in advancing
this narrative. But, data privacy, political underlying motives, competition
law, ideological and cultural understandings all play their respective roles in
framing the digital market landscapes of the U.S. and EU that we know today. In particular, the relationship between competition law and privacy regulation cannot be overlooked and are increasingly being considered as part
and parcel in contemporary EU competition analysis. As Wasastjerna states
“data is the price consumers pay for access to various online offerings and
to platforms like Facebook and Google. How that personal information is
treated by businesses is becoming a competition issue.”108 According to conventional thinking competition law is interested in data for its economic
value, whereas data protection rules deal with personal rights, but not necessarily the market value of data.109 However, the value that individuals place
on the protection of their personal data carries equal weight to businesses,
the legal community and policy makers alike.110 It is the EU’s conventional
price-centred competition analysis that has drawn it to view data as an economic value and categorised it as such in the myriad of merger control cases
throughout the last decade. The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal in
which data from 87 million Facebook users was illegally taken from the platform for electoral manipulation fuelled citizens’ awareness of the data gathering practices undertaken by large corporations and governments by way of
gathering, analysing and selling their personal data. This in turn catalysed
the intellectual discourse of the complex and highly fascinating intersection
between competition law and data privacy.111 As the next section will
demonstrate, by incorporating privacy as a non-price element in competition
analysis can it serve in the interests of the consumer by way of fostering a
competitive market for data privacy solutions amongst market actors. This
will in turn enable Europe to set the right standard to effectively compete in
a market that is mostly dominated by American technology giants.
108. Maria C. Wasastjerna, The Implications of Big Data and Privacy, 30 EUR. BUS. LAW REV.
337, 338 (2019).
109. Id.
110. Alessandro Acquisiti et. Al., What is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 249, 249
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Privacy and Competition

The increased expansion of U.S. firms such as Google, Facebook,
Amazon and Apple into the EU demonstrate how privacy and competition
law are substantially interlinked concepts. Although an economic cost analysis makes sense when considering potentially anticompetitive behaviour,
non-price dimensions are equally important due to the very fact that citizens’
personally identifiable data is being managed, processed and sold for a profit.
Therefore, if the price effect of a transaction is the only factor competition
authorities take into account it will inevitably lead to some anticompetitive
mergers being approved “unconditionally, with a significant future costs potentially imposed on consumers.”112 Due to the fact that these U.S. tech firms
are being challenged in the EU for potential anticompetitive behaviour one
would expect privacy to play a prominent role in striking down their anticompetitive practices. But, to a large extent competition authorities have not
been successful in explaining why privacy is and ought to be a relevant factor
for purposes of competition law. Ever since the merger case of Google/DoubleClick113 the debate on the relationship between competition and privacy
in the context of data has been ongoing. The reason for the more gradual
transition towards a more accepting approach towards privacy being a vital
component of competition policy comes partly from the polarized nature of
the debate. Namely, there are those who strongly advocate for competition
enforcement to prevent consumer harm in the form of privacy violations,
“whereas others see data as just another type of input or strategic asset, and
view privacy concerns as falling outside the scope of intervention by competing enforcers.”114 Although a gradual shift is identifiable in the approach
towards privacy playing a role in merger cases, this has only been gradual
and relatively recent. When looking at the competition analysis in
Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp115, compared to Microsoft/LinkedIn116 in 2016 and Apple/Shazam117 in 2018, the former cases
dismissed concerns related to privacy and held that “privacy harms form the
increased concentration of data resulting from the transaction were outside
the scope of competition law.”118 In the Microsoft/LinkedIn case, however,
the European Commission explicitly noted that data privacy is an important
component of competition and held that “by getting commitments from Microsoft that it will keep the market open, we’ve helped to allow companies
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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to compete to protect privacy more effectively.” It is the ability of firms to
compete in a market focused on the adequate provision of consumer privacy
protection that that will set the European Commission apart from its U.S.
market counterpart. Allowing U.S. technology firms to enter the EU and entrench their novel business practices that conventional EU competition rules
have as of yet failed to catch up on has enabled them to accelerate the their
presence as data-opolies on the continent. This in turn prevented equivalent
European data-driven businesses to enter and compete with incumbent market actors.
Moreover, the import of U.S. firms that favour data transfer practices
to advance economic benefit and “consumer choice”, coupled with the EU’s
cost-based analysis of data transactions in competition policy, neglect the
foundational principles of preserving dignity, self-preservation and democratic values. What becomes evident is that a certain disconnect can be found
between the human rights-based privacy narrative and the practical application of EU competition law in the digital market. The EU’s constitutionally
entrenched privacy protections are undoubtedly crucial for preserving adverse encroachments of public and private actors on our everyday lives. But,
by addressing it in silo the European Commission has come to realise that
this approach renders these protections as mere theoretical safeguards that
fail to grasp the realities of technological advancement. Not only was it necessary for the law to catch up, but it was vital for it to recognise privacy’s
inter-connectedness with the word of business and competition. The Commission aptly demonstrates this in the TomTom/Tele Atlas120 case in 2018
where it noted that “confidentiality concerns can be considered as similar to
product degradation in that the perceived value of the map for PND [personal
navigation device] manufacturers would be lower if they feared that their
confidential information could be revealed to TomTom”.121 As Wasastjerna
states:
“According to the Commission, confidentiality concerns as to the customer information question could lead to reputational damage and customers considering switching products. Here, privacy was looked at as
a sort of quality component in the competitive assessment of the merger.”122
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Can’t (Oct. 25, 2017).
120. Case Comp/M.4854 TomTom/Tele Atlas, C(2008) 1859.
121. Id. at 274-276.
122. Wasastjerna, The Implications of big data and privacy, 347.

150

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 13:2

Enabling firms to utilize privacy as a quality component in essence
replicates the consumer welfare test by taking into account moral and nonprice considerations that reflect both the all-encompassing psychological and
economic facets of competition policy. Continuing on the trajectory of recognising privacy as a competition analysis element is the right way forward
as it not only promotes the privacy narrative underpinning the European project as a whole, but it will enable European firms to establish themselves as
legitimate competitors within the digital economy by simultaneously setting
a precedent for recognising privacy as a core component of their business
model. The EU and U.S. regulatory frameworks depict two extremes on a
scale of protection afforded to privacy and innovation, respectively.
This further demonstrates how the contrasting approaches to privacy
on both sides of the Atlantic reflect their respective cultural, economic, historical and political philosophies and rationales. Not one model is better or
more equipped than the other and it is vital for policymakers and businesses
alike to understand that achieving a balance between economic prosperity
and privacy is the right way forward.
The above analyses provide a deeper understanding of the profounder grounds for differences in the systems and have, in turn, greatly assisted our ability in finding a way forward in devising a transatlantic data
transfer framework. By recognizing both regimes’ pitfalls and sacrosanct
cultural and ideological interests, are we able to discern a viable middleground that potentially serves as an exemplary framework for countries in
the future. The last section of this paper will address and provide a recommendations on the most effective regulatory approaches that enable the development of a sophisticated future transatlantic data transfer framework. In
doing so, it will touch on the methods that businesses and consumers should
start adopting to protect their privacy, whilst simultaneously recognising the
benefits that data transfers bring to the wider economy as a whole. Before
doing so, it will start by providing some context by offering a brief overview
of the “Safe Harbor Agreement” and “EU-U.S. Data Privacy Shield” that
serve as precedent transatlantic data transfer agreements between the U.S.
and EU.
G. Safe Harbour and the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Shield

The path towards creating a harmonized transatlantic data privacy
framework is not one of unchartered waters. The “Safe Harbour” was the
most important first-generation solution to the issue of international data
transfers.123 Global data flows were already present in the pre-internet age
and by the late 1980s European policymakers realized that their efforts to

123. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 158.
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create strong safeguards for data protection necessitated transborder policies
for the data of EU citizens.124 In 1999 the influential group of national data
protection commissioners already identified what can be seen as the EU
skepticism about the sufficiency of U.S. information privacy law.125 However, with the vast amounts of valuable data trade between the EU and the
U.S. taking place, both sides recognized the necessity to find policy solutions
to bridge the gap between their different legal approaches to citizens’ data
protection.126 The result of this policy initiative was the Safe Harbor Agreement, a bilateral treaty negotiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce and
the Commission of the EU that:
“transplanted EU data protection concepts into U.S. law in a fashion
beyond the willingness of Congress or the ability of the FTC and other
regulatory agencies. Its principles were intended to be close enough to
those of EU data protection so that the U.S. companies in following
them would provide ‘adequate’ data protection.”127

The initial functioning of the Safe Harbour agreement can be described as receptive on both sides of the Atlantic. The main reason that made
the agreement acceptable in the U.S. was that the negotiated standards weakened classic EU principles to such an extent to make the agreement tolerable
to the Americans.128 But, it did not make them indefensible in Brussels to the
extent that the EU viewed these standards as excessively watered down.129
However, on October 6, 2015, we saw the demise of the Safe Harbour agreement’s promising future as a result of the Snowden revelations, which detailed widespread collaboration by American companies with the NSA.130
Inevitably, this called into doubt the adequacy of the protection of European
citizens’ data in the U.S. The European Court of Justice’s opinion in Schrems
v. Data Protection Commissioner131 voided the Safe Harbour agreement and
identified a violation of Article 7 of the Charter by the Safe Harbour’s provision that enabled access to the U.S. government of the data of EU citizens.132 Notably, the court made clear its strong criticism of the NSA’s
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massive suspicionless data dragnets and bulk storage of information.133 As
Schwarz and Peifer point out, the Schrems case marked a turning point in
EU-U.S. relations and showed the EU judiciary’s willingness to invalidate
the main vehicle for transatlantic data flow and establish constitutional requirements for this activity to occur.134
With the continuing need for a transatlantic data transfer framework
between the EU and the U.S. post Schrems, the two sides negotiated a new
treaty called the “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield”.135 The Privacy Shield essentially
incorporated the respective models of EU and U.S. data privacy and, therefore, is best understood as a mixture of EU and U.S. standards.136 The EU’s
perspective hinged on the need to protect individuals from the state and private data processors alike. The U.S. maintained its strong market orientation
and favored open choice for consumers regarding data use and their ability
to retain broad access to “innovative American data services and products.”137 The mixture of EU and U.S. standards simultaneously enabled the
EU to influence the agreement to resemble its fundamental principles while
allowing the U.S. to argue for weaker forms of core EU data privacy principles. The Privacy Shield’s balanced approach culminated in establishing four
core Privacy Shield Principles; “data integrity and purpose limitation,
choice, enforcement, and oversight.”138 Essentially, the Privacy Shield displays concessions by both sides regarding their conceptions of an adequate
data privacy framework. However, with the European Court of Justice as the
ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of the Privacy Shield and the Schrems
opinion in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, the position of EU negotiators during its development phase was immeasurably strengthened.139
Therefore, despite both sides’ concessions the bilateral agreement depicts
strong moves into the direction of EU data privacy principles more than the
Safe Harbour agreement did.140
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134. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 160.
135. Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker at EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
Framework Press Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (July 12, 2016), https://useu.usmission.gov/joint-press-statement-from-commissioner-vera-jourova-and-secretary-of-commerce-wilbur-ross-on-the-third-annual-eu-u-s-privacy-shield-review/ (last accessed Nov. 12, 2019).
136. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 161.
137. Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker in Transatlantic Data Privacy
Law, 161.
138. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles (2016),
https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last accessed Nov. 12, 2019).
139. Case T-670/16, Digital Rights Ireland v. Data Prot. Comm’r (2016) (General Court filed
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Arguably convergence in Europe and the United States around data
privacy has occurred “within a common technological context”141 and different countries have “converged around statutory principles of data protection, but diverged in policy instruments selected to implement and enforce
them.”142 The continued bilateral effort by the EU and U.S. demonstrates
their willingness to identify adequate policy instruments to implement and
enforce these statutory principles effectively. However, I aim to demonstrate
that underlying discrepancies remain visible in relation to these jurisdictions’
approaches to data privacy that, in turn, undermine the effective and targeted
realisation of a transatlantic data privacy framework. An ideal depiction of
such a framework would encapsulate “the key forces for convergence in data
privacy”, which constitute “the shared technological environment, increased
political agreement around the benefits of personal data flow, and common
security and law enforcement concerns.”143 However, giving the EU the upper hand in enforcement enables such principles and balanced objectives to
be compromised. This becomes increasingly evident within the confines of
understanding the benefit of personal data flow between the two countries.
To the same extent that U.S. companies are taking a more EU-friendly approach regarding the international flow of data, should European policymakers deploy policy initiatives to modify its law to accommodate aspects underpinning U.S. information privacy law.144 In November 2016 the German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, called for a balanced approach to data protection
that accords to the age of Big Data.145
Rightly so, the continent benefits vastly from the flow of data within
our interconnected global digital market. European industry should take advantage of the benefits that accompany the use of personal information
within the confines of reasonableness, but more “than data protection currently permits.”146
As per my above analysis, the success and growth of European industry is dependent on access to personal data and the current state of affairs
places too much weight on the protection of fundamental rights. By recognising the importance of digital economic transactions, will such a framework be able to manage and balance both the economic relations and the
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protection of fundamental rights. In turn, this will enable both European data
protection and competition law to serve as an interconnected, accommodating and advantageous framework for European business vis-à-vis its competitors in the U.S. and beyond.147 Such lobbying has already started to take
place and should be seen as a welcome development in devising an adequate
and balanced approach to international data transfers.148 The final section of
this paper will go into more detail regarding the regulatory approach such a
framework should take and endeavours to recommend the way in which the
EU can use its capacity “to solve problems in a pragmatic and focused manner without sacrificing its strong fundamental rights values and traditions.”149 In doing so, it emphasizes the need for an ex ante regulatory approach to tackling dominant market actors that aims to understand the
underlying dynamics that define today’s complex digital markets. Based on
this understanding we will be able to establish an effective data privacy
framework that places more control within the hands of the individual regarding her personal data. As a result, such a framework will adequately address both the desire for increased data privacy and the economic benefit of
data transfers to the consumer and wider economy, albeit within the confines
of reasonableness.
H. A Step-By-Step Approach: Understanding Digital Market Dynamics
as the Right Way Forward

The theme this paper emphasizes above is how privacy and competition law are highly related concepts in high-tech industries. By recognizing
the benefit of compromise between the U.S. and EU frameworks this paper
therefore argues that an effective international data transfer framework must
address both market dominance and data privacy as interconnected concepts.
The current digital climate enables firms such as Amazon, Google, Apple
and Facebook to capitalize on data to develop better services, which attracts
more users, which as a result generates more data. Finding the right balance
between the benefits of data use to spur innovation and the protection of fundamental rights will aid towards the reduction of these firms’ dominant market position and, therefore, serves as the right place to start. Limiting their
ability to collect swaths of data, places more power in the hands of consumers and enables a more equal playing field for other market entrants to
147. Schwartz and Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 167.
148. Derek Scally, Minister ‘Heartened by Merkel Shift on Data Privacy Law, IRISH TIMES
(2016), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/minister-heartened-by-merkel-shift-ondata-privacy-laws-1.2882211 (last accessed Nov. 19, 2019).
149. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council – Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring Trust through Strong Safeguards, COM (2016) 117 Final (Feb. 29,
2016),
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compete. Such a framework will, in turn, enable the creation of an effective
approach to regulating what information can and cannot be used by companies in their pursuit of growth. Devising such clear boundaries will, however,
be much harder to accomplish in practice. Therefore, this section will
demonstrate how ex ante regulatory enforcement, as opposed to ex post antitrust techniques, in combination with an effective data privacy framework
can prevent the accumulation of vast amounts of data and prove beneficial
to privacy and innovation. Whilst recognizing that reform is needed in competition policy, it is vital for regulators to act earlier when simpler methods
or regulation can prevent the entrenchment of a dominant monopolist.
Namely, “the complexity of disentangling Google’s dominance emphasizes
the more general point that earlier intervention is more warranted in technology markets because dislodging incumbents requires more complex remedies than traditional antitrust divestiture solutions.”150 This proposal endeavours to lay out the core principles that should serve as the foundation of a
sophisticated transatlantic data transfer framework that places power back in
the hands of the consumer. The precise contours and content of provisions
goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it enables them to be discerned from
the broader techniques and solutions it will put forward.
1. Data Portability

One approach towards achieving a harmonised international data
transfer regime emphasises the need for “data portability.”151 This approach
recognizes the inadvertent impossibility of circumventing data monopolists
and as a result argues for “incumbents to be required to give start-ups access
to some of their data and thus create more competition.”152 However, attempting to simply transfer swaths of data garnered over the years by these
firms into a coherent, accessible and logical framework for the regulator to
quantify is a near impossible task to undertake.153 What type of data should
be shared, in which format and “how the tension between data-sharing and
privacy” can be resolved are pertinent questions in this regard.154 The GDPR
in Europe serves as an example, where bringing personal data back into the
hands of the user is mandated. Such a proposal is made more complex due
to the inevitable international operability of data transfers. Simply requiring
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THE ECONOMIST (June 28, 2018), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/06/28/howregulators-can-prevent-excessive-concentration-online (last accessed Dec. 16, 2021).

156

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 13:2

spin-offs or imposing data sharing requirements in one jurisdiction forgets
this inter-jurisdictional element. Such a proposal firstly requires a harmonized approach between the EU and U.S. that understands the fundamental
workings of the digital market. Only then will this enable effective enforcement measures and implementation techniques to be developed. Namely,
break-ups of tech giants and the divvying up of all the data the tech giants
have collected becomes an obsolete practice in a market place composed of
businesses with network effects. That is not to say that this proposal should
be entirely disregarded. As one commentator argues, a better approach is to
ensure that divestitures are complemented by regulation that weakens the
ability of these tech giants to grow into completely new creatures once broken up, commonly referred to as the “starfish problem”.155 As will be argued
below, reasoned and targeted ex ante regulation in combination with a privacy-oriented framework, in my opinion, serves the needs of combatting the
pitfalls the regulatory landscape currently has.
2. Regulatory Sophistication
Essentially, the harms from data-opolies exceed that of conventional monopolies. Beyond the financial consequences to consumers these harms also affect
our “privacy, autonomy, democracy, and well-being.”156 Contrary to Chicago
School economic thought, it is evident that the data-driven market dominated by
these firms will not necessarily correct itself. As explained above, antitrust law itself
has proven to be ill-suited in its current form and must adapt to the current digital
market landscape in order to prove the undoubtedly key role it can play in enforcement. Moreover, antitrust law serves as an ex post enforcement mechanism that
merely enables regulators to capture firms once their dominance has already been
established and practically places them one step behind these firms every time they
detect anticompetitive behaviour. In my opinion, placing increased emphasis on the
ability for consumers to control their personal data, thereby reducing technology
companies’ dominance over such data, is an effective way in accomplishing such
intervention.157 This would encourage a market where users can vote with their data
and demand greater share of a company’s “profits based on that data, switch to competing providers for a better deal, or withhold their data altogether after learning
about the use of their data by third parties.”158 Other proposals surround “Do Not
155. Breaking Up is Hard To Do: Dismembering Big Tech, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/business/2019/10/24/dismembering-big-tech (last accessed Nov. 23,
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Track” rules and “opt-in” consent to be required for the use of data by third parties.159 Proposals solely focusing on this area propose to adopt greater transparency
requirements regarding how tech giants monetise data. Therefore, this approach
must be complemented by a technically detailed regulatory framework akin to Newman’s analysis, which combines the proposals of bringing data back to the consumer
with pre-determined techniques that are able to discern how data is collected, analysed and used. The ex-ante regulations that bring the power to control what happens
with data back into the consumers’ hands are vital for holding big tech companies
accountable. The next section highlights how such data ownership models, flexibly
applied solutions and trust mechanisms offer consumers and businesses alike the
ability to achieve a sophisticated and technologically advanced approach to preserving data privacy and the advancement of innovation.

3. Data Ownership Model

One way of ensuring individuals’ empowerment is by supporting the
creation of a data ownership model in which consumers can be fairly compensated for their personal information which is being traded.160 This goes
contrary to those that state that “data is often considered a resource, like oil,
to be traded, ideally by equally well-informed parties to the transaction.”161
In order to get to this degree of awareness, personal control over data must
be offset against equally important concerns such as public interest and the
rights and freedoms of others.162 Thus, “absolute control over personal data”
is difficult to guarantee and providing control is also more necessary than it
is sufficient in the overall scheme of data privacy protection.163 It forms one
part of a larger puzzle of the proposed regulatory solutions and goals. One
method of ensuring increased ‘prosumerism’ is through the creation of socalled ‘data vaults’.164 This method allows individuals to better control who
can access their data and for what purpose, and requires security mechanisms
that ensure that “only those entities authorized by the data subject can access
the data and only those parts for which they are authorized.”165 These “personal data stores”166 are considered to be most effective where they concern
current and constantly updated information, such as geospatial data or signs
of life.167 Those that have been granted access are not only obliged to respect
159.
160.
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161.
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164.
165.
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167.
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the rules about data sharing and use, but are also bound by the technical safeguards underpinning these systems. On the long term, this system paves the
conditions for true consumer choice to be achieved as it enables data portability choices to be placed in the hands of individuals. In particular, the possibility for a consumer to change the service one is using is the “single most
effective power of a consumer to influence the market of services available
to them.”168 Data portability’s practical possibility to transfer most of one’s
own data from one service provider to another, therefore, serves as an “effective starting point for creating the conditions for true consumer choice.”169
In practice this transferability is harder to achieve, which this paper will expand upon below in the section on ‘Data Trusts’. Before doing so, the next
section will address what exact form and shape the regulator’s tools and
mechanisms should take, and how they contribute to the objective of making
them suited for regulating the complexity of today’s technologically sophisticated market actors.
4. Technological Solutions and the Need for Flexibility

In particular, one such technological solution is the creation of ‘practical data sharing models’ that can combine various legal and technical approaches to data releases, that together with robust disclosure limitation techniques, can be designed to provide public access to some data without
restriction.170 This way data is able to be transformed into differentially private statistics. Thereby, restricting the use of data by data processors according to the terms of a data use agreement and accessible only though a secure
‘Data Enclave’ akin to the Data Vaults referred to above. Data Enclaves employ “strong data security measures, maintain operational logs, incorporate
vetting of individual researchers who seek access, engage in disclosure review of outputs before data release and publication, and follow strict requirements for data retention and destruction.”171 Whenever data processors require a substantial amount of data, they would be instructed to submit an
application to a review board, whose outcome would identify the permitted
and restricted uses of the data. Such proposals make use of auditing procedures in which secure public ledgers, such as blockchain technologies, implement secure records of transactions, enabling robust auditing and review
procedures.172 Kagal and Pato have gone even further by introducing a system “that can express realistic data-use policies, and automated reasoning
168. Id.
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engines that can interpret those policies and automatically determine whether
particular uses of data are policy-compliant.”173 By giving data processors
machine-readable representations of policies it facilitates automatic compliance with those rules and enables users to preserve privacy while sharing
sensitive data.174 A data processor’s job in determining which policies are
applicable to a particular query is difficult to understand, but this system automatically enforces policies and lets consumers understand what kinds of
queries are allowed under those policies if a request has been denied.
This aptly demonstrates the potential for technology to not only embrace the innovatory capacity of data transfers, but also embed its function
into the preservation of privacy through highly sophisticated semantic policy
tools.175 However, this system functions on explicit and rigidly applicable
policies to ensure that data processors can accurately ascertain whether they
are using data in compliance with usage policies. In reality, many enquiries
or data transfer requests will not conform to these readily ascertainable riskbenefit analyses or policy goals and as a result, require cross-sectional review
by experts through flexible, universal, and consistent policy tools. Not only
do these type of solutions provide stronger privacy protection for individuals,
but they enable the adaptability to respond to new and sophisticated privacy
leaks and attacks that “were unforeseen by regulators at the time that legal
standards were drafted.”176 This systematic approach will, therefore, allow
data collection and release mechanisms to “be tailored to the threats and vulnerabilities associated with a given set of data, and the uses desired by different users.”177 Furthermore, as alluded to above, new computational methods, such as secure multiparty computation andsecure public ledgers, such
as Blockchain technology and executable policies, provide the ability to limit
the direct operation that can be performed on data. Thereby limiting the inferences that can be made about individuals.178
What the above demonstrates is that constant data review “in combination with a data use agreement restricting future uses and re-disclosures
of the data, as well as data privacy and security” technologies, can all be used
to address many of these concerns. They touch on many foundational requirements around which an effective data infrastructure should be built.179
By utilizing traditional tools together with more sophisticated and developed
173. Id.
174. Id.
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technical tools that place control on the computation, inference, and use of
data, companies can provide more systematic, regular and up-to-date review
of privacy risks and appropriate practices. The conflicts of interest between
the protection of data subjects on the one hand and the company’s concomitant fiduciary duty towards their shareholders’ profit sharing motives on the
other, demonstrate that internal policy tools and mechanisms, with well-intended values and criteria, still have their limitations. Nevertheless, the
awareness and consciousness within companies of their responsibility and
accountability in creating the necessary infrastructure that supports the creation of a balanced data privacy framework is one step in the right direction.
Yet, in the absence of a larger guiding framework the presence of these conflicts regarding ethical uses of data are likely to lead to inconsistent practices.
Therefore, the need for a technological independent supervisory mechanism
serves to address these deficiencies to which this paper turns to next.
Namely, the inherent complexities of the underlying structural composition
of our modern digital market make it nearly impossible for businesses to
control, audit, and review information relating to a significant amount of individuals by themselves in an independent and fully impartial manner.
5. Trust Mechanisms as a Tool for Individual Empowerment

The data Trust proposal is an ‘express Trust’180 that requires the appointment of independent trustees who are essentially bound by the Trust’s
purposes and terms. These purposes and terms can vary from one trust to
another according to the particular type of data sharing/protection interests
data subjects have. Most important in this regard, is that this mechanism allows for:
“[A]n ecosystem of Trusts, where a variety of data sharing policies
across Trusts gives data subjects a range of choices that reflect their
personal trade-offs: the resulting diversity also allows society to explore different principles for data sharing within the same digital ecosystem.”181

A reason for arguing that a third-party independent Trust serves in
the interest of both data portability and protection, as opposed to company
‘in-house’ review and supervisory mechanisms, emanates from the fiduciary
duty of data controllers that independent trustees do not have. According to
Balkin, economic and tax incentives ought the be offered to data controllers

180. L. Roderick, ‘Discipline and Power in the Digital Age: The Case of the US Consumer
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in exchange for their accepting ‘fiduciary obligations’ towards data subjects. The problem with this proposal is that data controllers cannot fulfill
their ‘undivided loyalty’183 towards data subjects as doctors or lawyers do
towards their patients or clients. Namely, if a data controller has a business
interest in the data provided by data subjects, this will result in a conflict
“between that interest and her duty towards data subjects.”184 The fiduciary
obligation towards data subjects becomes incompatible with the controllers’
responsibility towards shareholders, as they would be obliged to both maximize the value of the personal data they collect whilst fulfilling their fiduciary obligation of data minimisation towards the data subjects at the same
time. Delacroix and Lawrence state that the honouring of a fiduciary obligation not only demands independence from profit maximization, but also requires “an ability to relate to the complex and multi-faceted nature of the
vulnerability inherent in the data subject/data controller relationship.”185 This
serves as a foundational starting point from which the use and purpose of a
data Trust can be determined. Instead of using ex-post compensatory tools
or direct ‘data processor-data subject’ processing restrictions to be implemented by organisations themselves, the data Trust challenges the data governance framework ‘from the ground-up.’186 By focusing on the source of
the data this framework can function on the terms and conditions its data
subjects impose, without the interference of conflicting parties or interests.
As a result, it also empowers data subjects right from the start.
This paper does not go into the inherent technicalities underpinning
the functioning of data trusts. But, it is important to note that Trusts may
specialise or generalise according to the type of data administered on behalf
of the beneficiaries. For example, one Trust may specialise in health data
whereas another Trust might focus on geospatial data sharing. The primary
purpose is to enable an ecosystem of data Trusts to emerge that recognizes
the innovatory capacity underlying data processing practices, while simultaneously providing data subjects with the ability to make independent and
informed choices that reflect their political and moral aspirations.187 The
need to choose among different Trusts encourages data subjects to actively
think about their sharing preferences before they are placed in a potentially
vulnerable position. This not only allows the data subject to form a personal
preference and conscience about his or her own values and interests in this
182. J. M, Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 UC DAVIS L. REV.
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realm of privacy but also influences Trusts to accommodate those requirements with tailored approaches to data governance. As more people join data
Trusts over time, the terms and conditions will also change according to the
participants’ particular interests. As a result, this will enable Trusts to develop stronger leverage when negotiating with data processors. Instead of
agreeing to particular terms of services, users will “simply state which data
Trust they belong to.”188 Only this way can we truly enable data subjects to
regain control over their personal ‘self’ and be empowered to control public
perception within the realm of our rapidly changing digital world.
This ex-ante policy approach forms part of an overarching inter-dependent, stakeholder approach to data governance. It is, therefore, not a ‘onesize-fits-all’ tool as it allows data subjects to choose a Trust that “reflects
their aspirations, and switch Trusts when needed.”189 Most notably, trustees
are able to exercise data rights conferred by top-down regulation (e.g. the
GDPR)190 on behalf of the Trust’s beneficiaries, and are bound by a fiduciary
obligation of undivided loyalty to the Trust’s purpose. The way this system
works is in line with the foundational legal mechanisms underpinning the
functioning of traditional legal Trusts. Namely, the data trustees would “be
placed in a position where they can negotiate data use in conformity with the
Trust’s terms, thus introducing an independent intermediary between data
subjects and data collectors.”191 On the one hand, it recognizes the balance
between data subjects’ informed consent and on the other the ability for these
Trusts to remove key obstacles to the realisation of the economic and innovative potential underlying large datasets.
I.

The Need for Transparency

The techniques and solutions outlined above are a strong step in the
right direction and provide regulators with a sense of the technological sophistication required in order to take the job seriously. Enforcers will ultimately need to “coordinate with privacy and consumer protection officials
to ensure that the conditions for effective privacy competition are in
place.”192 This in turn serves a more appropriate and balanced ex ante approach to regulating the data driven economy. To achieve this, we need coordinated government action to determine exactly how data mining and behavioural profiling by technological behemoths strengthens their dominance
and harms consumer welfare.193 It will take time for exact techniques to be
188.
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developed and must, therefore, be preceded by a transparent data collection
framework from which more sophisticated techniques can be developed.
Making information about data collection available routinely will help develop the infrastructure and analytics necessary to eventually adapt antitrust
enforcement to the contemporary digital landscape.194 It is therefore vital to
work towards a rapid understanding of the actions taken by corporations that
serve as the underlying complaints of potential entrants that find it impossible to enter the digital market.195 Bringing control over users’ data back to
the consumer itself will, in turn, complement the development of an approach to privacy that helps create a monitoring infrastructure that systematically studies, categorises, and characterises technology firms’ behaviour (as
much as it happens the other way round right now). The development of such
a sophisticated framework must, however, first be led by governmental entities and experts outside agencies in order to provide the fundamental structure upon which the consumers themselves can operate on the long term. Not
until such a foundational regime is in place can competition law authorities
as well as citizens hold large firms accountable and mandate the contours
under which these firms are permitted to make use of personal data. As Bennett argues, Europe and the United States have “converged around statutory
principles of data protection, but diverged in policy instruments selected to
implement and enforce them.”196 The regulatory approach this paper proposes, elucidates how this ongoing convergence can accelerate both from an
ex-ante and ex-post standpoint. It lays the foundation for a sophisticated and
balanced framework from which more targeted policy instruments can be
formulated. Only with a clear sense of how data is being collected, analysed,
and used can an adequate international data transfer framework be deployed
that accommodates both privacy interests, healthy competition and the economic desire to innovate.
J.

Conclusion

This paper addressed the ongoing data privacy debate by delving
deeper into the respective data privacy frameworks of the U.S. and EU in
order to understand what underlying dynamics are shaping their inherently
contradictory approaches to our digital market landscape. In doing so, it
started in the first part by identifying the philosophical theories underpinning
their respective rationales in an attempt to discern what ulterior motives and
contextual dynamics play a role in shaping this dichotomy. It argues that the
European rights-oriented project serves a politically salient motive that is
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undoubtedly premised on the idea of bringing ever-lasting peace to Europe.
But, to some extent it also functions as a façade to encourage the wide-scale
roll-out and adoption of a European identity that is framed through a rightsbased narrative. Thereby, using its emphasis on human rights as a red herring
or smokescreen for the myriad of other politically underlying objectives the
European project set out to achieve. Furthermore, the EU’s competition rules
as they stand hinder the emergence of comparable “European Champions”
capable of taking on rivals from China and America. Thus, contradicting the
simple notion that its anaemic capital markets are due to “misguided jealousy” towards the U.S. and that numerous factors, such as culture, ideology,
history and competition policy all play a role in shaping the framework’s
understanding. The exact same analysis can be made in relation to the myriad
of reasons underpinning the U.S.’s ‘success’ in creating some of the largest
and most influential technology platforms in the world. Beyond the U.S. conception of data marketability and the view of the individual as a trader of a
personal commodity, namely her personal data, U.S. antitrust law serves as
the catalyser in enabling the ability of these firms to grow, in undoubtedly
anti-competitive ways. The above analyses have enabled us to garner a
deeper understanding of the profounder grounds for differences in the systems and demonstrate how a balanced framework, functioning within the
bounds of reasonableness, is beyond desirable. By recognising both regimes’
underlying shortcomings and potential for convergence has this paper been
able to discern a regulatory approach that will serve as an exemplary model
from which effective policy instruments and implementation mechanisms
can be developed. The starting point must be the recognition of privacy and
competition as highly related concepts in high-tech industries. Making information about data collection available routinely will help develop the infrastructure and analytics necessary to eventually adapt enforcement to serve
the contemporary digital landscape. The conflict of jurisdictions within this
novel area of law should be seen as a unique opportunity that has provided
the necessary context and legal parameters to experiment with technologically influenced policy that could serve in the interest of nations and generations to come.
The international operability of data transfers is a depiction of the
digital revolution that is shaping the way consumers, businesses and governments play their part in the contemporary digital market. The digital saturation of reality has granted companies with extraordinary capabilities and advantages to understand their customers and business with a new depth of
granularity.197 Industry lines are no longer a boundary to growth. The disruption of increasingly sophisticated technological developments enables those
197. Accenture Technology Vision 2019, https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF94/Accenture-TechVision-2019-Tech-Trends-Report.pdf#zoom=50 (last accessed Nov. 20, 2019).
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early to the game to bypass competition by changing the way the market
itself works. This has come in waves and it is now up to regulators to crawl
under the skin of how their dynamics are changing the inherent structure of
the markets. The rise of the next set of new technologies such as distributed
ledger technology, artificial intelligence, extended reality, and quantum
computing will catalyse the way businesses are reimagining entire industries
to yet another level. The insurmountable benefits of this rapidly evolving
technological era is not unencumbered by equally important and complex
challenges. The ability of regulators, businesses and consumers to anticipate
the impact of these changes calls for an equally sophisticated regulatory
framework that addresses the needs and interests of all relevant stakeholders
in the market. Only through such an approach can we take full advantage of
this challenge and strive to set an example for the wider community when
addressing current and future privacy concerns.
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